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Abstract  
The recent revolts of the middle class in the national capitals of the Philippines and 
Thailand have raised a new question about democratic consolidation. Why would the 
urban middle class, which is expected to stabilize democracy, expel the 
democratically elected leaders through extra-constitutional action? This article seeks 
to explain such middle class deviation from democratic institutions through an 
examination of urban primacy and the change in the winning coalition. The 
authoritarian regime previously in power tended to give considerable favor to the 
primate city to prevent it revolting against the ruler, because it could have become a 
menace to his power. But after democratization the new administration shifts policy 
orientation from an urban to rural bias because it needs to garner support from rural 
voters to win elections. Such a shift dissatisfies the middle class in the primate city. 
In this article I take up the Philippines as a case study to examine this theory. 
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1. Introduction∗ 
 
The recent uprisings of the middle class in the national capitals of the Philippines (in 
2001) and Thailand (in 2008), and which created political instability, raised a puzzling 
question about democratic consolidation. Why would the urban middle class, which is 
expected to mitigate conflict and stabilize democracy1, try to expel the democratically 
elected leaders through extra-constitutional actions? This article will argue that urban 
primacy, which the previous authoritarian regime enhanced, and the change in the 
winning coalition after democratization determine the behavior of the middle class of 
the primate city.  
 
The authoritarian regime previously in power favored the urban area, especially the 
national capital, being fearful of an urban uprising. On the other hand, the regime did 
not concern itself so much about the area outside the national capital because the rural 
population is dispersed and did not pose a threat. Such favoritism to the urban sector, 
what is called urban bias, causes urban migration, urban development, and eventually 
urban primacy, which is the concentration of population in the primate city (the largest 
city in the country). After the coming of democratization, the new administration, 
conversely, shifts policy orientation to a rural bias because it needs to garner enough 
votes from outside the primate city and where the majority of the population still resides. 
Such a shift of policy dissatisfies the residents of the primate city, especially the urban 
middle class which has been the beneficiary of urban-biased development. They have 
little chance of winning elections against the rural vote due to their limited numbers. 
Therefore they believe that there is a higher probability that they can change the 
administration through the extra-constitutional means of uprising because of their 
geographical advantage. These conditions give the urban middle class the incentive to 
take extra-constitutional action to obtain political power.  
 
                                                 
∗ The author thanks Yasushi Hazama, Masashi Nakamura, Koichi Kawamura, Kazuki 
Minato, Kiichi Fujiwara, Kazuo Ogushi, Shinichi Takeuchi, Kengo Soga and Tomohiro 
Machikita for their insightful comments. 
1 Most notably, Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: 
Economic Development and Political Legitimacy” American Political Science Review, 
53 (March 1959), 69-105. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson also perceive the 
middle class as a buffer to stabilize democracy. See Daron Acemoglu and James A. 
Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), pp.38-40. 
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The urban-rural cleavage affects democratic stability significantly, especially in new 
democracies which have experienced economic growth, though not all cases of 
instability are caused by this cleavage. This article focuses on democratic instability 
related to the urban-rural cleavage as one of several patterns of instability. In the 
following section, I present a model of urban-sector deviation from democratic 
institutions. I will then examine this model using the Philippines as a case study. 
 
2. A Theory of Instability in New Democracies 
 
Democracy as Equilibrium  
Democratic institutions become stabilized when democracy is “the only game in town.” 
It is the situation where major political groups observe democratic institutions in 
solving conflicts. This fits the argument of “self-enforcing democracy,” which claims 
that the stability of democracy comes about when it constitutes equilibrium. In other 
words, democracy becomes stable when no one has the incentive to deviate from the 
strategy of observing democratic institutions2  
 
Democracy brings the equality of political participation, but not the equality of 
outcomes. If we follow Joseph A. Schumpeter’s classic definition of democracy3, which 
emphasizes the institutional arrangement for selecting a leader, that person must be 
decided by competition, particularly by elections. Equal political participation is a 
fundamental condition here. In this institutional setting, the representative of the 
majority naturally acquires power. The problem is that he represents only the majority’s 
                                                 
2  Adam Przeworski, 1991, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic 
Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), p. 26. Instability arises if at least one of the major players does not follow the 
strategy of observing democratic institutions. We can suppose two patters of deviation 
from democracy as Barry R. Weingast suggests. One is that the leader suspends 
democratic rule and exercises power arbitrarily. For example, the leader remains in 
power despite losing the election, or the leader suspends elections in anticipation of his 
defeat. Another pattern is that of out-of-power groups taking extra-constitutional action. 
For instance, they try to remove the leader through violent demonstration instead of 
constitutional procedures. See Barry R. Weingast “ Constituting Self-Enforcing 
Democracy in Spain.” in Irwin L. Morris, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Karol Edward 
Soltan eds., Politics from Anarchy to Democracy: Rational Choice in Political Science, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 161-195. This article focuses on the 
latter pattern of instability. 
3 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, (London: George Allen 
and Unwin Ltd. 1976), p.269. 
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interest. He does not optimize the interests of the entire population, which should 
include the minority. Hence, the equality of political participation produces the “winner” 
who can make policies closer to his ideals, and the “loser” who is excluded4.  
 
The stability of democracy, therefore, depends on whether or not the “loser” accepts 
defeat. The loser’s acceptance means that the leader concedes power to the new winner 
if he lost in the competition, and that the out-of-power groups refrain from taking 
extra-constitutional action to oust the leader if they do not win power through 
democratic procedures5.  
 
I define the expected utility of the out-of-power player (the loser in the election) in 
accepting defeat, i.e., observing democratic institutions as6: 
EUሺacquiesceሻ ൌ δ · pE · Y 
δ א ሾ0, 1ሿ
pE א ሾ0, 1ሿ
 
 
 : discount factor for the future payoff 
 : the probability to win the next election 
 : the increased share of resources deriving from holding power 
 
I also define the expected utility of the out-of-power player in taking 
extra-constitutional actions as: 
 
EUሺrebelሻ ൌ pR · Y െ C ൅ E 
pR א ሾ0,1ሿ
                                                
 
: the probability of winning power through extra-constitutional means  
C: the cost for extra-constitutional action 
E: the entertainment effect obtained by participating in extra-constitutional action7 
 
 
4 Adam Przeworski, “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense” in Ian Shapiro 
and Casiano Hacker - Cordón eds. Democracy’s Value, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), pp.23-25. 
5 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America, p.19; Christopher J.Anderson, André Blais, Shaun Bowler, 
Todd Donovan, and Ola Listhaug, Loser's Consent: Elections and Democratic 
Legitimacy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
6 To make the calculation of payoffs simple here, I do not suppose a repeated game.  
7 This means fun, enjoyment or satisfaction in taking part in the collective movement. 
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If the former payoff is larger than the latter, the out-of-power player keeps to the 
institutions. Otherwise, it takes extra-constitutional action. 
δ · pE · Y ൒ pR · Y െ C ൅ E
δ · pE · Y ൏ pR · Y െ C ൅ E
E
 
    ---------- observes institutions   
     ----------- ignores institutions  
 
The seriousness of social cleavages, the types of political institutions and geographical 
conditions affect the expected utility of the out-of-power player and that of the leader.  
 
The resource share Y is related to the stakes of politics8. Political institutions decide 
how much discretionary power is given to the leader especially regarding resource 
distribution. As the stakes of politics get larger, Y increases. It is a matter of how much 
the constitution provides power to the leader, and how exclusively power is controlled 
by the majority.  
 
Political institutions also affect p  and δ. The electoral system is the most important 
institution in this regard. Proportional representation opens the chance for small parties 
to obtain seats in the legislature, and enhances opportunities for the minority to join the 
ruling coalition, unlike the single-member district. The length of the term in office and 
term limits on public office decide the discount factor . If the term is short, or 
reelection is not granted,  gets larger for the out-of-power player.  
 
Political institutions also affect cost C. This is primarily the cost of risking individual 
lives and assets. Secondly it is the cost of solving the coordination problem. In order to 
pose a strong threat to the leader, the out-of-power player as a group usually needs to 
become unified and formulate a protest movement on a large scale. The out-of-power 
player is rarely a cohesive entity as it has intra diversity. The difficulty in getting groups 
with different interests to cooperate in taking collective action is called the coordination 
problem, and this is also considered as a cost for the protest movement. If there is a 
focal point which induces cooperation among groups, cost C is restrained to a lower 
level9.  
 
                                                 
8 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America, p.36. 
9 See Barry R. Weingast, “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of 
Law.” American Political Science Review, 91, (June 1997), 245-263. 
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Figure 1 shows the relation between the expected utility of observing democratic 
institutions and that of deviation from such institutions.  
 
 
 
This figure is based on the assumption δ · p , on which the lines of EU (rebel) 
and EU (acquiesce) cross. Crossing point A is the threshold of deviation from 
institutions. If Y exceeds this point A, the out-of-power player deviates from democratic 
institutions and challenges the leader by means of extra-constitutional action. Otherwise, 
the out-of-power player keeps to democratic institutions and remains in the 
E ൏ pR
EU 
Y 
0 C െ E
pR
EUሺacquiesceሻ 
ൌ
C െ E
pR െ δ · pE
 
 
EUሺrebel  
pE ൏ pR E ൏ ܥ
A 
Observing Institutions Deviating from Institutions 
Figure 1 The Out-of-Power Player’s Expected Utilities and Strategies  
ሻ
Assumptions:δ · , . 
Strategies of the Out-of-Power Player 
Source: Author. 
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constitutional framework. Threshold A depends on the discount factor , the probability 
of winning elections p , the probability of taking power through extra-constitutional 
means , the cost of uprising C, and the entertainment effect E. Holding other 
variables constant, threshold A gets closer to 0 as 
E
pR
 and p  decrease. If E and p  
increase or C decreases, threshold A also gets closer to 0. In these cases there is a higher 
probability of deviation from institutions
E R
· pE ൒ pR
                                                
10. On the other hand, if δ , the lines 
of EU (rebel) and EU (acquiesce) do not cross. In that case the out-of-power player 
always keeps to democratic institutions regardless of Y. 
 
Change of Winning Coalition 
Instability in new democracies is caused by the drastic change of winning coalition 
following democratization. Regardless of the type of political regime, either 
authoritarian or democratic, the leader needs the support of certain groups in the society. 
These groups, which sustain power, are called the winning coalition11. The composition 
of the winning coalition varies depending on regime type and country. Generally, an 
authoritarian regime has a limited coalition. A democratic regime tends to have a 
relatively wide winning coalition, and the coalition is usually more diversified than that 
in the authoritarian regime.  
 
Normally the new winning coalition replaces the old one when democratization takes 
place. The old coalition loses its status, or at least needs to cooperate with other groups 
to take part in the new coalition. The winning coalition changes, firstly because the 
 
10 There are two contrasting arguments regarding the size of the opposition and the 
probability of democratic breakdown. One argues that the opposition prefers to keep 
institutions if the size gap between the leader and the opposition is smaller, because the 
opposition has a high probability of winning the next election. The other contends that 
the opposition prefers to challenge the leader through violent action if the size gap 
between the two is smaller, because the opposition has a higher probability of expelling 
the leader. See Mario Chacon, James A. Robinson, and Ragnar Torvik, When is 
Democracy an Equilibrium?: Theory and Evidence from Colombia's "La Violencia", 
(NBER Working Paper Series 12789, 2006). This is actually about pE and pR. The 
opposition’s action is decided by both parameters, not by one of them alone. The 
opposition obtains information about the size of its support through elections. For the 
significance of elections in providing information, see Przeworski, “Minimalist 
Conception of Democracy: A Defense” pp.48-49; James D. Fearon, Self-Enforcing 
Democracy. (Center on Institutions and Governance Working Paper No. 14, Berkeley: 
University of California Berkeley, 2006).  
11 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. 
Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), pp.51-55. 
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leader changes. Secondly, and more importantly, the coalition changes because the 
required size of the winning coalition varies under different political regimes. An 
authoritarian regime needs only a limited coalition. But a democratic regime needs a 
larger-sized coalition since power is obtained through elections. Under democratic rule, 
groups that seek power need to garner enough popular support to obtain and maintain 
power. The old winning coalition under the authoritarian regime is usually composed of 
the military, business elite, the bureaucracy and the hegemony party. Following 
democratization the old coalition either loses power or needs to collaborate with new 
forces in the society to join the new winning coalition.  
 
Such a change of winning coalition does not cause serious problems if the conflict 
between the old and new coalitions does not become intensified. But the conflict 
between the two coalitions becomes intensified if the gap between the leader and the 
out-of-power groups increases due to resource distribution, or if the old coalition is 
totally excluded from the new winning coalition. The old coalition also has an incentive 
to deviate from democratic institutions and challenge the leader if it believes that it has 
enough political resources to depose the ruler. In this sense, the instability of new 
democracies is, for the most part, determined by how the previous authoritarian regime 
deals with and is dealt with by the winning coalition.  
 
Instability of New Democracies in the Urban-Rural Conflict 
We will now turn to the conflict between the middle class of the primate city and the 
rural populace. Here the urban area means the primate city of the country, which is 
usually the national capital. The rural area, on the other hand, means the area outside the 
national capital including smaller cities.  
 
Robert H. Bates argues that the government policy of providing low-priced agricultural 
products to the urban residents is the main cause for the underdevelopment of the rural 
areas in Africa. The government, he argues, is afraid of an urban uprising which is a 
crucial threat to power. To avoid this risk, the government takes the resources from the 
rural area and distributes them to the urban area. An urban uprising would have a critical 
impact on power since the urban area is the place where power exists and economic 
activity is concentrated. By contrast, the rural population, although larger, is dispersed 
over a wide area which is a serious impediment to collective action, and therefore it 
poses less of a threat to power. This is the logic of Bates’ argument, and it is usually 
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called urban bias12.  
 
Urban bias is often seen under authoritarian rule because keeping the urban sector 
acquiescent is more important than garnering the majority in elections. At the same time 
there is a higher probability that urban residents have an incentive to rebel. The urban 
area is politically significant as it has a strategically critical role in sustaining power. 
Paralyzing the functions of the national capital can inflict fatal damage on power unlike 
guerrilla activity in the mountains. Moreover, the collective action problem can be 
mitigated relatively easier in the urban area as the cost of mobilizing people for mass 
action is lower. The necessary size for mass action is also smaller than in the rural area. 
The media deliver information about an uprising faster in the urban area so that the 
opposition can share the information and lower the cost of the coordination problem. 
These conditions enhance the incentive of urban residents to resist the ruler when they 
become dissatisfied with government policies. Even the entertainment effects seem to 
be higher in the urban area. Meanwhile, the rural area does not get much attention under 
an authoritarian regime as it does not pose a great threat because the ruler does not need 
to get its support in elections. Under an authoritarian ruler elections are highly 
controlled or can be suspended.  
 
The urban bias under an authoritarian regime induces a migration flow from the rural to 
urban area, especially to the primate city. Alberto F. Ades and Edward L. Glaeser., who 
examined the political effects of urban primacy using an econometric approach, showed 
empirically that an authoritarian regime has a statistically significant positive effect on 
migration to the primate city13. Ironically, the more that government policy encourages 
the urban bias, the greater the political threat that the urban sector imposes to the ruler. 
The urban sector accumulates the resources for political action through the urban bias. 
The increasing concentration of population and resources in the urban area makes the 
urban sector the core of the winning coalition. At the same time this shift means that the 
rural sector has less chance of getting into the coalition14.  
                                                 
12 Robert H, Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of 
Agricultural Policies, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). 
13 Alberto F. Ades, and Edward L. Glaeser, “Trade and Circuses: Explaining Urban 
Giants.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (February 1995), 195-227. 
14 Even under an authoritarian regime, however, the ruler sometimes emphasizes rural 
development if he has an ideological inclination toward the rural area. In such a case, 
the urban bias is limited. See Ashutosh Varshney, “Self-Limited Empowerment: 
Democracy, Economic Development and Rural India,” in Ashutosh Varshney ed., 
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The urban bias encouraged under the authoritarian regime causes a serious problem for 
the new leader after democratization. The liberalization that comes with 
democratization brings the rural sector into the winning coalition. Even though the 
urban sector grew under the urban bias, the rural population occupies the majority of the 
entire population in most of the developing countries. Politicians have a hard time 
taking power without the support of the rural vote15. Aside from voter geographical 
distribution, if a freely elected legislature is composed of representatives from the local 
districts, the legislators from the rural area will have the majority giving them the 
chance to implement policies that fulfill the demands of the rural vote. It has often been 
pointed out in fact that under a democratic regime politics acquire a rural bias16. Under 
a parliamentary system, party leaders need to take into consideration rural interests in 
order to take power. Even under a presidential system, a president needs to respond to 
the rural demands from the legislature. This situation gives the leader the incentive to 
adjust his policy orientation toward the interests of the rural vote. As long as the 
majority is rural based under a democratic regime, political leaders need to pay 
attentions to the demands of that majority. 
 
In the transformation of policy orientation from urban to rural bias through 
democratization, the middle class, which has been regarded as the median voter and the 
stabilizer of democracy, demonstrates that it is an urban voter in the urban-rural 
cleavage. This seems to explain better the urban middle-class deviation from democratic 
institutions. When a new democratic regime shifts policy toward a rural bias, the urban 
sector can be expected to show dissatisfaction17. This is especially true if the urban bias 
had been prominent under a previous authoritarian regime during which the urban sector 
grew rapidly. An urban middle class can emerge on a large scale during this time, and 
this new social class has interests that differ from those of the rural sector18.  
                                                                                                                                               
Beyond Urban Bias, (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass), p.209.  
15 However, if urban migration has been huge and the urban sector has come to 
compose the majority of the entire population, the theory set forth in this article would 
obviously be invalid. 
16 Varshney, pp.177-180; Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press. 1968), pp.433-461. 
17 Samuel P. Huntington also claims that the urban sector is always anti-government 
under a democratic regime. He argues that political instability is caused by the most 
advanced area, not by the backward part of the society. See Huntington, pp.72-78. 
18 The urban middle class also plays a crucial role in democratization. This does not 
mean that the urban middle class is out of the winning coalition under the authoritarian 
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The new leader under a democratic regime faces two conflicting problems. One is the 
threat from the old winning coalition, i.e., the urban sector, which was protected and 
strengthened under the urban bias of the previous regime. The other problem is to 
secure enough votes from the new winning coalition, the rural sector, which has a larger 
population. As a consequence, the leader faces the dilemma of trying to balance 
between the demands of the urban sector and those of the rural sector. If the leader fails 
in balancing his policies between the two, he will be deserted by the rural sector and 
lose the next election, or face a challenge from the urban sector that resorts to protest 
action19.  
 
The probability of an urban uprising following democratization is determined by the 
degree of urban bias before democratization. This is shown in the following model 
which again considers the expected utility of the out-of-power player. 
 
EU(rebel) =  pR · Y െ C ൅ E
pR
଴ · Y െ C଴ ൅ E
                                                                                                                                              
 
This time the expected utility of the out-of-power player on extra-constitutional protest 
action without the urban bias before democratization is defined as: 
 
EU(rebel)0 =  
 
regime. Only if the authoritarian regime is no longer capable of providing the urban 
middle with enough favors will it decide to leave the winning coalition. 
Democratization is partially, as Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter point 
out, the process of the struggle between the hard liner and soft liner. The behavior of the 
middle class can be understood in the same context. See Guillermo O’Donnell and 
Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 
about Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 
pp.19-20  
19 Richard Sandbrook sees the urban sector in Africa as the political winner in 
democratization but economic loser after democratization. He points out that the 
structural adjustment policies imposed by international donors actually has meant 
correction of the urban bias policy. Structural adjustment, therefore, triggered the 
frustration of the urban sector and eventually caused democratization. The new 
democratic governments, however, have had no choice other than continuing structural 
adjustment. Sandbrook notes that some leaders wooed the support of the rural rather 
than urban sector whereupon the urban sector turned its back on the new government. 
See Richard Sandbrook, “Economic Liberalization versus Political Democratization: A 
Social-Democratic Resolution?” Canadian Journal of African Studies, 31(3, 1997): 
482-516.  
10 
 
 
And the expected utility with the urban bias is defined as: 
 
EU(rebel)1 =  pRଵ · Y െ Cଵ ൅ E
pR
pR
଴ ൏ pR
ଵ
C଴ ൐ Cଵ
 
The differences of two expected utilities are the probability of success in protest action 
 and the cost of rebelling C. Urban bias increases the urban population and raises the 
income of the urban residents. This means the increase in political resources which 
leads to a higher probability of a successful uprising; hence . The development 
of the primate city also brings better transportation and information infrastructures. This 
reduces the costs of moving and solving the coordination problem; therefore . 
Figure 2 shows the relations of these different utilities. 
 
11 
 
Figure 2 Effects of the Urban Bias on the Out-of-Power Player’s Expected Payoffs 
 
 
This figure indicates that the out-of-power player tends to rebel against a leader at the 
lower threshold A1 if the pre-democratization regime had an urban bias. This means the 
urban sector has a higher propensity to deviate from democratic institutions if it 
EU 
Y 0 
C଴ െ E
pR
଴  
EUሺacquiesceሻ 
ൌ
Cଵ െ E
pR
ଵ െ δ · pE
 
EUሺrebelሻ଴
δ · pE ൏ pR
A1 
EUሺrebelሻଵ
 
Cଵ െ E
pR
ଵ
ൌ
C଴ െ E
pR
଴ െ δ · pE
A0 
 
Deviating from Institutions Observing Institutions 
Without the Urban Bias 
With the Urban Bias 
Observing Institutions Deviating from Institutions 
Strategies of the Out-of-Power Player 
Assumption: , E < C. 
Source: Author.  
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experienced an urban bias. The urban bias, in addition, widens the gap between interests 
which causes a larger Y. This promotes the condition for deviation from institutions.  
 
Here I have assumed that the out-of-power player’s expected utility in observing 
institutions is constant. Since urban bias enhances the inflow of migration to the primate 
city, the probability of winning the next election, , is actually expected to be higher. 
Nevertheless, urban bias increases probability  more than  because the increase of 
population in the primate city has more effect toward uprising than election when 
considering the entire population. Furthermore, probability P  is multiplied by the 
discount factor δ . The impact of the increase of  on threshold A1 does not seem 
to be so large.  
PE
PR PE
E
൑ 1 PE
 
3. Deviation from Democratic Institutions: The Philippines as a Case Study 
 
We will now examine the Philippines to test the theoretical model set forth above. The 
Philippines is grouped among the lower-middle-income countries by the World Bank. 
The country had democratic regimes after its independence in 1946 but turned to 
authoritarian rule in 1972. Democracy was restored in 1986.  
 
Since 1986 the Philippines has been regarded as a politically unstable country. President 
Corazon Aquino, under whom the country returned to democracy, endured repeated 
coup attempts during her term. President Joseph Estrada was ousted from the presidency 
by the protest movement in Metro Manila in 2001. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 
has also confronted urban demonstrations calling for her resignation.  
 
The ouster of President Estrada and the protest movement against the Arroyo 
administration were and have been mainly initiated by the urban middle class. These 
movements have used the word “democracy” to legitimize their actions, but they have 
deviated from the democratic institutions provided by the constitution. This 
phenomenon can be explained through focusing on the interests of the rural-based new 
winning coalition and those of the urban sector, mainly the middle class. 
 
Democratization and Change of the Urban Bias 
In order to claim that political instability in the Philippines since democratization has 
been caused by the change of policy orientation based on the shift of the winning 
coalition, it needs to verify, first, that there was an urban bias under the authoritarian 
13 
 
regime, and second, that the urban bias was eased following the return of democratic 
rule.  
 
Figure 3 shows the score of POLITY IV, which is a measurement of the political regime, 
and the ratio of the population in the national capital to the entire population20. As 
mentioned above, the empirical examination of Ades and Glaeser, based on a large data 
set, shows that an authoritarian regime tends to enhance the population inflow to the 
primate city. The data on the Philippines also show the same trend. The concentration of 
population in the national capital increased after 1975 under authoritarian rule. During 
the democratic periods before and after authoritarian rule, this trend was not and has not 
been seen. 
 
                                                 
20 POLITY IV Score is used here; it measures from maximum +10 to minimum -10, 
and the higher score indicates a more democratic regime. 
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Figure 3 Regime Change and Population Concentration in the 
Nationa l Capital in the Philippines（1948―2007）
POLITY IV Score Population Concentration in the National Capital
Note: The National Capital means the City of Manila and its vicinity for 1948‐1970 
and Metro Manila after 1975.
Source : National Economic Development Authority, Statistical Yearbook, (Manila: 
National Economic and Development Authority,1974); National Statistical Coordination 
Board, Philippine Statistical Yearbook, (Makati: National Statistical Coordination 
Board, various years); Monty G.Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr and Keith Jaggers, Polity IV 
Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2008, (Maryland: 
Center for Sytematic Peace, 2009). 
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The outcome of the period of high migration is that the level of urban primacy in the 
Philippines is now high by international standards (Table 1). As of the 2000 census, of 
the four largest cities in the Philippines with a population size exceeding a million, the 
top three are part of Metro Manila21.  
 
                                                 
21 National Statistical Coordination Board, 2009 Philippine Statistical Year Book, 
(Makati: National Statistical Coordination Board, 2009), Ch. 1. The four largest cities 
are Quezon City (2,173,831), City of Manila (1,581,082), Kalookan City (1,177,604) 
and Davao City (1,147,116). 
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Table 1 Urban Primacy of Selected Countries 
Country Urban Primacy Primate City/Total Primate City/Urban 
Thailand 14.57 0.13 0.21 
Argentina 8.99 0.33 0.36 
the Philippines 8.38 0.13 0.21 
France 7.04 0.16 0.21 
Chile 6.83 0.35 0.40 
Mexico 4.70 0.18 0.24 
United Kingdom 3.75 0.14 0.16 
Indonesia 3.31 0.04 0.08 
Japan 3.17 0.28 0.42 
Korea 2.77 0.20 0.25 
Germany 1.96 0.04 0.06 
Malaysia 1.71 0.06 0.08 
Brazil 1.60 0.10 0.12 
USA 1.52 0.06 0.08 
Spain 1.16 0.13 0.13 
India 1.14 0.01 0.05 
Italy 1.13 0.06 0.08 
Notes: "Urban Primacy" is the ratio of the first largest city's population to the second 
largest city's population. "Primate City/Total" means the share of primate city's 
population in total population. "Primate City/Urban" means the share of primate city's 
population in urban population. Populations of primate cities are as of 2007. Total 
populations, urban populations, and populations of the second largest cities are as of 
2005.  
Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database. 
http://esa.un.org/unup/  
 
As for the income gap between the urban and rural area, the income level in the national 
capital has been higher than that in other areas. Table 2 shows the average income per 
family in the Philippines.  
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Table 2 Income per Family (nominal, in pesos) 
year 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 
National 
Average 
31,052 40,408 65,186 83,161 123,168 144,039 148,000 172,730
Average in 
Metro Manila 
57,193 79,314 138,256 173,599 270,993 300,304 266,000 310,860
Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, 2009 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 
(Makati: National Statistical Coordination Board, 2009). 
 
The gini coefficient as of 2006 for the entire Philippines was 0.4580, while that for 
Metro Manila was 0.398822. This indicates that the level of income inequality in the 
Philippines is relatively high by international standards, but the income gap in Metro 
Manila is actually lower than that in other areas. This means that the gap between Metro 
Manila and other areas is large, although each area contains it own income gap.  
 
Having confirmed the growth of the national capital under authoritarian rule and the 
income gap between the urban and rural area, the question is whether government 
policies affect the gap between social classes in the urban and rural area. To test the 
effects of the government policies precisely, multivariate regression has to be used to 
control the other variables. Due to the limited amount of data available, the test will 
have to at least confirm the change of government policy from the urban bias under the 
authoritarian regime to less urban orientation under democratic rule.  
 
Cristina C. David presents effective rates of protection for the different sectors based on 
the series of estimations performed by the Philippine Institute for Development Studies. 
Figure 4 shows the data. 
 
                                                 
22 ibid., ch.2. 
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These estimates take into consideration the effects of government policies on 
intermediate input prices. The protection rate for manufacturing in 1974, two years after 
the start of authoritarian rule, was relatively high, reflecting the import substitution 
industrialization policy which started in 1950s. But the rate increased sharply thereafter 
until authoritarian rule collapsed in 1986. The rate went down after the return of 
democracy. On the other hand, the protection rate for agriculture, fisheries and forestry 
remained low throughout the authoritarian period. Starting from 1993-95 under the 
democratic regime, the rate went up. In other words, the gap of effective protection rates 
between the urban-based manufacturing sector and the rural-based agriculture, fishery 
and forestry sector was high under the authoritarian regime, but later decreased under 
democratic rule.  
 
Focusing on the agricultural sector highlights the urban bias under authoritarian rule and 
1974 1983 1985 1986 1988 1993 2000
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Manufacturing All Sectors
Figure 4 Estimates of Effective Protection Rates in the Philippines
Source: Cristina C. David, “Agriculture,” in Arsenio M. Balisacan and Hal Hill 
eds., The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 175-218.
% 
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its diminishment after democratization. Ponciano S. Intal and Marissa C. Garcia show 
that rice-price policy in the Philippines shifted from farmer protection in the 1960s to 
taxing the farmers in the 1970s, then a reversion to farmer protection in the 1980s and a 
further strengthening of that protection in the 1990s23. David also points out the same 
trend24.  
 
How do people perceive the policy shift on urban bias? Opinion surveys indicate that 
since the return to democracy, urban residents have constantly shown a low support rate 
for the government25. Table 3 shows the average rate of satisfaction in Metro Manila for 
the presidential administration compared with that rate outside the capital and 
nationwide26.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Ponciano S.Intal, , Jr. and Marissa C. Garcia. 2008. Rice and Philippine Politic, 
Research Paper Series No. 2008-1, (Makati: Philippine Institute for Development 
Studies, 2008). They used the examination results of Kei Kajisa and Takamasa Akiyama. 
Kajisa and Akiyama dealt with the rice-price policies in Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines, and they pointed out that self-sufficiency and price stabilization are the 
main motive of rice-price policy. See Kei Kajisa and Takamasa Akiyama, “The 
Evolution of Rice Price Policies over Four Decades: Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines.” Oxford Development Studies 33 (June 2005), 305 – 329.  
24 Cristina C. David, “Agriculture,” in Arsenio M. Balisacan and Hal Hill eds., The 
Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), pp.184-185. 
25 Ideally, there should be a comparison of the approval rating for the authoritarian 
regime with that for the democratic regimes. However, there apparently is no data for 
the authoritarian regime as it is impossible to conduct a survey on the issue under such a 
regime. 
26 Net satisfaction rate means the difference between the level of satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction. A positive figure indicates that there is more satisfaction than 
dissatisfaction with the administration.  
19 
 
Table 3 Average Net Satisfaction Rate with Each Administration by Areas (%) 
Administration Metro Manila Average Outside 
Metro Manila (1) 
Nationwide 
All  -3.8 9.9 7.7 
Aquino -15.4 9.3 8.4 
Ramos  4.7 15.8 14.4 
Estrada  12.4 14.8 14.3 
Arroyo  -11.8 4.6 0.6 
Note: Outside Metro Manila is composed of the areas of Luzon (excluding Metro 
Manila), Visayas and Mindanao. Sample size is 300 respondents in each area.  
Source: Social Weather Stations.  
 
This data clearly indicates that all presidential administrations since the return of 
democracy in 1986 have received less support from the urban area. On average the 
Estrada administration was relatively supported by the urban area, although the 
satisfaction rate in the rural area was higher. But the rate of satisfaction in the urban area 
for his administration dropped sharply just before his regime collapsed in January 2001. 
Figure 5 shows the trend. The Estrada administration had a net satisfaction rate of 6.7% 
in Metro Manila in September 2000, but it went down to -14% by December 2000. 
During that same period the net satisfaction rate outside Metro Manila did not drop so 
much.  
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Figure 5 Net Satisfaction Rate before and after the Fall of the Estrada Administration
Source: Social  Weather Stations.
Estrada
 
 
As the above data indicates, there was an urban bias under the authoritarian regime, and 
a shift away from this after the Philippines returned to democracy in 1986. Coinciding 
with this policy trend, each administration since 1986 has faced the frustration of the 
urban area. 
 
The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, which was enacted after the return to 
democracy, prohibits reelection of the president. This causes a problem in explaining the 
policy bias toward the rural area as an incentive for a president to seek reelection. 
Nonetheless, the president still needs to gain support from the rural area, firstly because 
he/she needs the cooperation of the House of Representatives to legislate policy 
initiatives. Most of the Lower House members are elected from single-member districts 
in the rural area, and rural demands are predominant there. For this reason the president 
has an incentive to consider the rural interest. This is one of the consequences of 
democratization, as the House members are elected in free elections. Secondly, the 
president has an incentive to raise the support rate for stable political management. 
Providing the resources to the rural area serves this purpose more efficiently than to the 
urban area, as the majority of the rural populace is in the lower income class which 
tends to rely on government subsidies. 
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Deviation from Democratic Institutions: The Fall of the “Populist” President  
Vice President Joseph Estrada won the 1998 presidential election by a large margin over 
House Speaker Jose de Venecia, who placed second. Considering that Speaker de 
Venecia was backed by the incumbent president, Fidel Ramos, along with the 
organization and resources of the government, it seems that Estrada’s victory was made 
possible by his personal popularity. Table 4 shows the share of votes of each candidate 
in the 1998 presidential race. 
 
Table 4 Share of Votes for Candidates in the 1998 Presidential Elections (%) 
 Metro Manila Nationwide 
Joseph Estrada 37.0 39.9 
Jose de Venecia, Jr. 10.8 15.9 
Raul S. Roco 25.8 13.8 
Emilio Osmeña 3.4 12.4 
Alfredo Lim 16.2 8.7 
Renato de Villa 3.6 4.9 
Miriam Defensor-Santiago 2.3 3.0 
Juan Ponce Enrile 0.7 1.3 
Santiago Dumulao 0.1 0.1 
Manuel Morato 0.1 0.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source：Commission on Elections, May 8, 1998. 
 
Although Estrada received slightly less support in Metro Manila, he garnered sufficient 
support nationwide. On the other hand, de Venecia, who depended on the resources of 
the government through the incumbent president’s support, received support mainly 
from the rural area. This implies that the government resources were more effective in 
the rural than urban area27.  
 
The Estrada administration, however, soon after its inauguration began to exhibit an 
inclination toward cronyism. The media started reporting scandals. The expose that 
proved fatal was delivered in October 2000 by a local politician on Estrada’s 
                                                 
27 It is possible to say that critical voters in the urban area who had supported the 
Ramos administration switched to supporting Estrada as the urban sector was not 
supportive to the incumbent administration.  
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involvement in an illegal gambling operation. This triggered the impeachment trial in 
December of the same year. As the impeachment hearing went on, the entire picture of 
president’s corruption was gradually uncovered. One of the core issues was the bank 
account Estrada had under a fake name. When the Senate, which was conducting the 
impeachment trial, decided in January 2001 not to make public the information on the 
account, people gathered at EDSA Street in Metro Manila and marched toward the 
Presidential Palace to demand the immediate resignation of the president. The military 
leaders and some cabinet members then withdrew their support, and Vice President 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as the new president. The Estrada 
administration had collapsed in the middle of its term28. 
 
Estrada’s involvement in illegal gambling is usually highlighted in the incident, which 
gives the impression that a conflict among traditional politicians was the cause for the 
administration’s collapse. But if we take a look at the participants in the event, it would 
be more precise to say that the president’s behavior damaged urban middle-class 
interests, and this led to the demonstration against the administration.  
 
Emmanuel S. De Dios has argued that the Estrada administration was involved in a new 
type of the corruption, what De Dios terms “market-mediated” corruption, in addition to 
the traditional “old-niche” corruption29. “Market-mediated” corruption operates through 
market manipulation, especially stock-market manipulation, while “old-niche” 
corruption is based on rent-seeking through government regulations. The Estrada 
administration allegedly utilized government social security funds to intervene in the 
stock market, and this benefited close allies of the president. This type of corruption 
destroys trust in the market, and when the government cannot show its commitment to a 
fair market, investors hesitate to enter the market. When the scandal over stock-market 
manipulation (the BW Resource scandal) was reported in the media in January 2000, 
stock prices plunged sharply; by October prices had gone down more than 30 percent 
compared with the previous year. The exchange rate was also affected; the value of peso 
went down from 1 dollar = 39.98 pesos to 51.95 pesos. 
 
Such a situation mainly affected the urban sector. The impeachment trial which started 
                                                 
28 See Sheila S. Coronel, Investigating Estrada: Millions, Mansions and Mistresses. 
(Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2000); Amando Doronila, 
The Fall of Joseph Estrada: The Inside Story, (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 2001). 
29 Emmanuel S. De Dios, “Corruption and the Fall,” in Doronila, pp. 43-61. 
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in the Senate in December 2000 made public the information about the market-mediated 
corruption. The daily impeachment hearings and the fall in the peso exchange rate 
became the focal point for the urban middle class and business elite which solved their 
coordination problem. The Senate’s rejection of revealing the information about 
Estrada’s secret bank account greatly reduced the probability that the impeachment trial 
would solve the political confusion. In the situation the urban middle class turned to a 
strategy of extra-constitutional action to change the administration. The media’s 
reporting on the street demonstration raised the entertainment effects which helped 
further in solving the coordination problem.  
 
The Estrada administration wooed the support of the members of Congress, especially 
of the House of Representatives, through additional distribution of pork barrel funds to 
prevent the impeachment trial from starting. The administration also organized the 
populace of the lower-income class to counter the movements of the middle class. 
Estrada constantly displayed the pro-poor stance that he had presented in the 1998 
election. This was actually the redistribution of private goods, through pork barrel, to 
the lower-income class. Although there is a significant-sized lower-income class in 
Metro Manila which benefited from this redistribution, the rural area has the greater 
number of lower-income residents. Consequently, the Estrada administration’s 
redistributive policy favored the rural sector more30. 
 
Estrada’s opponents and the participants in the four-day demonstration in January 2001 
were mainly the urban middle class. Maria Cynthia Rose Banzon-Bautista confirmed 
this using the data of Pulse Asia. Pulse Asia along with the Social Weather Stations, 
both prominent survey institutions, use the ABCDE ranking of social classes for their 
social research31. The criterion for classifying social classes is consumption. A and B 
indicate the rich; C indicates the middle class; D is the poor, and E is for the very poor. 
The ranking distribution in the Philippine population is 10 percent for A, B and C, 72 
percent for D and 18 percent for E. The majority of the Philippine population belongs to 
D and E, the poor and very poor. According to the Pulse Asia research, the composition 
of the participants in the anti-Estrada demonstration in Metro Manila was 18 percent 
from A and B, 47 percent from C, 31 percent from D, and 4 percent from E. This means 
that the people from the A, B and C classes combined made up 65 percent of the 
                                                 
30 Arsenio M. Balisacan, “Poverty and Inequality,” in Balisacan and Hill, p.315. 
31 Maria Cynthia Rose Banzon-Bautista, “People Power 2: ‘The Revenge of the Elite 
on the Masses’?” in Doronila, pp.1-42. 
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participants in the demonstration. Considering the abovementioned ranking of the 
population distribution, we can see the prominent role that the rich and the middle class 
played in bringing down the Estrada administration. Bazon-Bautista adds that 9 percent 
of D that joined the rally was from the educated class and the participants from E were 
mostly organized laborers. Table 5 presents the data on the participants. 
 
Table 5 Composition of the Participants in the Anti-Government Rally in Metro 
Manila in 2001 by Social Class (%) 
 Population Distribution in the Entire 
Nation 
Participants in the Rally 
A and B 
10        65 
(18)
(47)C 
D 72 31 
E 18 4 
Total 100 100 
Source: Maria Cynthia RoseBanzon-Bautista, “People Power 2: ‘The Revenge of the 
Elite on the Masses’?” in Amando Doronila, The Fall of Joseph Estrada: The Inside 
Story, (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 2001), p 9. 
 
The middle-class protest against the government has continued since the Estrada 
administrations. Arroyo, who assumed the presidency after Estrada left office, was 
initially supported by middle-class support. But eventually she sought the support of the 
rural area. The net satisfaction rate in Table 3 clearly shows the urban-rural cleavage in 
support for the Arroyo administration. Table 6, which shows the share of votes in the 
2004 presidential election, also augments the evidence that President Arroyo depended 
on the rural vote. The 2004 election was an exception to the 1987 constitutional 
framework because the incumbent president ran for reelection. Arroyo was able to seek 
reelection as she assumed the presidency in the middle of her predecessor’s term. As the 
incumbent leader, Arroyo was able to use the government resources for her election 
campaign. It was the typical electoral campaign of the incumbent, based on the 
reelection incentive to mobilize the rural vote through the use of government 
resources32.  
                                                 
32 For example, there were reports that health insurance cards are distributed to the 
lower-income class in the rural area. Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 11, 2004. It was 
later reported that government funds for fertilizer were allegedly used to finance the 
election campaign; this report affected the popularity of the Arroyo administration after 
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Table 6 Share of Votes in Exit Polls for the 2004 Presidential Election (%) 
 Metro Manila Nationwide 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 26.5 40.4 
Ferdinando Poe, Jr. 36.5 36.5 
Panfilo Lacson 19.0 10.8 
Raul S. Roco 8.1 6.2 
Eduardo Villanueva 9.8 6.1 
Source: Social Weather Stations. 
 
A year after the 2004 election, it was revealed that the Arroyo administration had 
manipulated the vote counting in the election. News of the scandal set off calls for the 
president’s resignation. Ten cabinet secretaries resigned to protest the scandal. There 
was a coup attempt in 2006, and anti-administration demonstrations repeatedly took 
place in Metro Manila. Urban dissident action has been the main cause of political 
instability under the Arroyo administration. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This article has sought to explain the political instability of new democracies focusing 
on the out-of-power player’s deviation from democratic institutions. The main argument 
for the cause of this instability is 1) the growth of the old winning coalition under the 
authoritarian regime previously in power, 2) the change of the winning coalition 
following democratization, 3) the shift of policy orientation by the new democratic 
administration, and 4) that administration’s failure to coordinate class interests. By 
focusing on the urban-rural cleavage, this article has sought to explain why the middle 
class, which is supposed to consolidate democracy, sometimes deviates from democratic 
institutions. Another factor has been urban primacy, a phenomenon widely seen in 
developing countries where many new democracies are emerging. The puzzling 
question of middle-class involvement in democratic instability is better explained in 
such an economic and geographical context. 
                                                                                                                                               
the election. Business World, August 28, 2005. 
